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Abstract 
In this study I compare the credit condition with the economic growth in Italy 
from January 2007 onward. Starting from the literature on the creditless 
recovery, I highlight the specific features of the Italian situation in which, 
notwithstanding the prolonged and deep economic crisis, the credit has 
persistently continued to grow. A comparison with the German case confirms 
the peculiar characteristics of the Italian condition. An econometric study 
supports this idea and, in order to depict this Italian economic situation, I 
propose a new expression: the recoveryless credit growth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent studies have analysed a phenomenon that can characterize the post-crisis periods: the so called 
creditless recovery. When a creditless recovery occurs one can observe economic growth together 
with a negative, null or very limited credit expansion. Abiad, Dell’Ariccia and Li (2011), and 
Coricelli and Roland (2011) recently focused on this specific issue. In the first cited work the authors 
stated that the creditless recovery has been not so uncommon in the past. Indeed, the creditless 
recovery has been frequently observed in their sample, the twenty per cent of the recoveries they 
analysed occurred without a credit growth. Coricelli and Roland (2011) focused on the credit flows 
instead of the credit level. They discovered that, in certain circumstances, a nation can grow even if 
the credit does not support the economy. According to their work, it is necessary that firms have 
alternative sources of financing, through a developed financial framework, in order to observe a 
creditless recovery. Moreover, the authors underlined that, when a creditless recovery occurs, 
industrial sectors more linked to banking system undergo a slower recovery. The crucial point in this 
strand of literature is that a recovery can occur even if the credit does not show a brilliant upturn after 
a recession. 
A study by Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2006) analysed this type of economic framework and found 
that the creditless recovery has been not so infrequent in the past, especially in the emerging 
economies. Furthermore, other works, like the one by Claessens, Kose and Terrones (2008) found that 
the creditless recoveries occurred in industrialized countries too. In addition, as pointed out by Calvo, 
Izquierdo and Talvi (2006), even the Great Depression showed some features that are typical of a 
creditless recovery. Following this last study, Calvo and Loo-Kung (2010) proposed a short work in 
which they focused on the subprime crisis in the US underlining the common traits between the Great 
Crisis and the so called Phoenix Miracle. According to their opinion, even the US ongoing crisis is 
showing features that are very similar to the ones of a creditless recovery. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Gupta (2006) analysed 36 banking crises in 35 countries, included 
Italy, and, among the other results, they emphasized that the economy returned to pre-crises level in a 
shorter time if compared to the credit performance. They also stated that, during the banking crises 
they analysed, recoveries did not seem to be driven by resumption in bank lending. In other words, 
they found a decoupling of these two indicators in the aftermath of these crises. 
This type of recovery is interesting because, as affirmed by Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2006), 
the productive sectors linked in a close way to the banking system, and that operate in a country with 
a well-developed financial system, suffer a deeper value added decrease in comparison with sectors 
that have a lighter linkage with banks. This feature is confirmed by Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache and 
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Rajan (2007). They found that, in case of a banking crisis, sectors highly dependent on external 
finance show a very negative performance and this result is even more evident in developing 
countries or in countries with limited access to foreign finance. This aspect can be useful to 
understand the different performance of the industrial sectors if the banking system decides to cut 
loans, creating a credit crunch. Moreover, on this issue, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) linked credit 
tightening to firms condition and established that enterprises with low levels of capital suffered with 
more intensity the impact of a credit crunch. 
Given this strong linkage between credit and real economy, it seemed interesting to analyse the 
situation in Italy during the last years in order to establish if the inversion of the economic cycle has 
been characterized by a slow or a rapid credit growth. In fact, in Italy firms are deeply linked to the 
national banking system and this could act as a brake to recovery if banks decide to limit or reduce the 
credit flows. Besides, Italy did not experienced bank failures or financial instability but the Great 
Crisis has had a large impact on real economy.  
The results shown in the next pages will highlight a very particular picture for the Italian case. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A macro scenario and some economic data about Italy 
are proposed in the second section. In section three I show data on gross domestic product, industrial 
production and credit in Italy and I compare the Italian case with the German one. The fourth section 
is focused on the econometric results used to support the main idea of the paper. The last section ends 
the paper with conclusions. 
 
2. The macroeconomic scenario 
 
As pointed out by many studies, creditless recoveries usually take place if the previous economic 
downturn has been characterized by banking or/and real estate crises. When these two destabilizing 
economic phenomena led to a crisis, the following recovery has been quite always characterized by a 
very slow increase in credit. Given the fact that the Great Crisis has been preceded by both global 
banking and real estate crises the importance of studying the Italian situation after the crisis is 
increased. 
In the previously cited works some explanations of the creditless recovery have been proposed. For 
example, after a slump it is possible that firms increase the production using the unused capacity and, 
in so doing, they do not need new or additional funding. As a consequence, one can observe an 
increase in industrial production and in gross domestic product accompanied by a stable amount of 
loans. 
A second explanation could be linked to the operational choices of the banks. During a post crisis 
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period, banks could focus on high productivity industrial sectors that usually show a better 
performance in the short to medium run and, on the same time, they can reduce loans to mature 
sectors that typically have low productivity and a slower upturn. This behaviour can lead to a growth 
in production and GDP even if the total amount of loans remains stable. So, a different behaviour of 
the banking system towards the borrowers can explain the decoupling between credit and economic 
growth. 
A third possible explanation of a creditless recovery is that firms can search for new funding through 
different channels by-passing the banking system. As a consequence, statistics do not register an 
increase in banking loans because firms receive new flows of funding from other sources but, at the 
same time, we observe a recovery. 
Finally, another possibility is that firms use their own liquidity and capital to restart the activity in the 
immediate aftermath of the crisis. This can also lead to a different trend between production and 
loans. 
These possible explanations of the creditless recovery do not reduce the importance of studying what 
has happened in Italy after the recession. Indeed, Italy has been one of the nations that suffered a very 
deep decrease in the GDP in 2008 and 2009, see table 1. It could be interesting to find some linkages 
between the Italian economic trend and the state of the credit.  
 
Table 1: GDP trend in major economies. 
Yearly percentage change 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Australia 4.6 2.6 1.3 2.7 
Canada 2.2 0.5 -2.5 3.1 
France 2.3 0.1 -2.5 1.5 
Germany 2.8 0.7 -4.7 3.5 
Italy 1.5 -1.3 -5.2 1.3 
Japan 2.3 -1.2 -6.3 3.9 
South Korea 5.1 2.3 0.2 6.1 
Singapore 8.8 1.5 -0.8 14.5 
United Kingdom 2.7 -0.1 -4.9 1.3 
United States 1.9 0 -2.6 2.8 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
 
It is essential to remember that Italy registered a great reduction in the GDP but the decrease of real 
estate prices has been very limited and banks did not suffer any problems thanks to a traditional way 
of making their own business. This framework is compelling because one can suppose that, given a 
not so dramatic situation for the banking system, the natural consequence should have been a rapid 
recovery of both the real economy and the credit aggregates. But data depict a different scenario. 
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3. The Italian situation 
 
This paragraph shows some data about the Italian economic scenario. After a very deep recession, the 
industrial production and the GDP showed a recovery. But, the economic growth has been very light 
during the period analysed in this section. The indicators remain really far from the peaks reached 
before the crisis. Starting from the first quarter 2007, figure 1 shows the trend of real GDP, industrial 
production and loans to firms and households, while figure 2 plots the annual change of the loans. 
Loans show a positive stable trend during 2007, then we observe a reduction in the growth trend and 
only during the last quarters it seems that the growth restarts with a more intensive pace, see figure 2 
for more details
2
. The evolution of real GDP and industrial production is completely different. The 
real GDP remained stable from the first quarter of 2007 to the mid 2008, then we observe the 
recession and only in the second part of 2009 the cycle became again positive, even if the growth has 
been very slow. A similar trend has been traced by the industrial production. But, in this case, the 
decrease of the index has been stronger. Indeed, the industrial production index declined from a value 
of 101 in the first quarter of 2008 to 76.5 in the second quarter of 2009. 
Summing up these first data, we can observe two main features. GDP and industrial production 
showed a reduction while loans showed only a slowdown in their trend. Loans annual change has 
always been positive, see figure 2. The second peculiar feature is that the situation showed in the last 
quarter of the sample is really odd in the light of the previously cited literature: loans are more than 20 
points above the value of the first quarter of 2007 while GDP and industrial production are 4,5 and 
15,4 points below the starting value. 
This situation is completely different from the so called Phoenix Miracle proposed by Calvo, 
Izquierdo and Talvi (2006) or by  Biggs, Mayer and Pick (2009). In Italy we did not observe either a 
reduction of the stock of loans or negative global flows of the credit to firms and households. The 
consequence is that Italy did not certainly experience a creditless recovery, given the fact that the 
trend of the loans objectively induces to reject this scenario. 
At the same time, we can also reject the hypothesis, made by Kannan (2010), of a linkage between the 
slow growth of firms that are more linked to banking funding and a reduction of the credit flows 
supplied by banks after the financial crises. This situation has not been observed in Italy because the 
total amount of loans has increased. 
On the contrary, in Italy the credit condition has been positive during and after the crisis while the 
economy did not show a rapid inversion of the cycle. Just for this reason it is possible to reverse the 
structure of the sentence, together with its meaning, by constructing a new expression for the Italian 
                                                 
2
 In June 2010 the Bank of Italy changed the time series calculation for loans, but even if we correct the data for this 
change the trend of the loans remains positive. 
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case: the recoveryless credit growth. 
 
Figure 1: Industrial production, real GDP and loans in Italy. 
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Source: Personal elaboration on Central Bank of Italy and Istat data.  
 
Figure 2: Annual change of loans in Italy 
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Source: Personal elaboration on Central Bank of Italy data. Loans: firms and households loans by 
banks. 
 
 
This situation has been clearly depicted by Draghi (2011) in his Concluding Remarks during the 
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Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of the Bank of Italy in May 2011. He remembered that 
Italy “recouped only two of the seven points of output lost” during the crisis and, at the same time, 
“banks have stepped up their lending to firms markedly”. He added that in April 2011 the annual rate 
of growth of loans to firms was “the highest among the main countries of the euro area”. Even the 
Draghi’s words confirmed the idea of a recoveryless credit growth for Italy. 
The Italian economic situation is probably affected by structural problems that reduce the potential 
growth of the economy, but the really slow recovery is not linked to credit problems. 
In order to offer a more complete and robust framework, I compare the Italian situation to the German 
one. In this case I employ the same sources of the data to make them directly comparable. Data on 
industrial production and GDP are taken from Eurostat web site while data on loans to non financial 
corporations and households are taken from the ECB web site. 
The situation is the one depicted in figures 3 and 4. It is straightforward to observe that loans to non 
financial corporations are more than 20 points above the reference period in Italy while in Germany 
they are 10 points above the first quarter of 2007. Moreover, if we compare the last datum with the 
pre-crisis pick we observe that loans are above the pre-crisis pick in Italy while they are still below in 
Germany. The two figures depict the loans to households too. In this case the difference between the 
German and the Italian trend is remarkable. In Germany this type of credit remained stable for the 
sample examined in the figure, while it showed a positive trend in Italy for the entire period. It is 
necessary to stress that between the second and the third quarter of 2010 this type of loans registered a 
change in the time series in Italy, so the increase registered during that period is abnormal. But, 
notwithstanding this, the trend remained positive for the whole period
3
. The situation is completely 
different for the industrial production. The last datum of the industrial production reached the pre 
crisis level in Germany while in Italy it is more than 15 points below. As regards the real GDP, 
Germany bridged the crisis losses and now the real GDP is at the same level of 2008, while real GDP 
is still below the 2007-2008 levels in Italy
4
. 
This comparison has highlighted the significant diversity between the German case and the Italian 
one. Given these results, it is possible to classify the German economic situation as a case of 
creditless recovery while, using the new terminology proposed in this paper, it is possible to assert 
that the Italian economic situation form 2007 to 2011 is a recoveryless credit growth.  
In the next section I support this analysis through an econometric study that focuses on Italy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 In figure 1 and 2 this time series change has been eliminated using data by Central Bank of Italy. 
4
 Figure 1 and figure 4 show slightly different real GDP trends because data in figure 1, by Istat, are corrected for 
seasonal effects while data in figure 4, by Eurostat, are not. 
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Figure 3: Industrial production, loans and GDP in Germany, reference period: first quarter of 2007. 
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Source: personal elaboration on ECB and Eurostat data. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Industrial production, loans and GDP in Italy, reference period: first quarter of 2007. 
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Source: personal elaboration on ECB and Eurostat data. 
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4. An econometric study on the Italian case 
 
I decided to support these findings through an econometric study. In this way it is possible to confirm 
the idea that the Italian economy behaved in a different way during the last years. To this aim, in this 
paragraph, I show the regressions and the data used for the estimations.  
I decided to employ data on GDP, from Istat, on 3 months Euribor rate, from Eurostat, on loans to non 
financial firms and households, from the Central Bank of Italy
5
, and data on employees, from Istat. 
The dependent variable is the real GDP. None of the regressors are used in the calculation of the 
GDP. The choice of the regressors has been made in order to use three indicators of the economic 
situation: a monetary indicator, the Euribor rate, a credit condition indicator, the loans, and a real 
economy indicator, the number of employees. All the series have been downloaded in November 
2011. 
I computed the quarterly percentage change of these series to limit or to eliminate the presence of the 
unit root. The presence of unit roots has been tested through the Phillips Perron and the KPSS tests. 
Results are shown in table 2 and they confirm the absence of stationarity problems. 
 
Table 2: Unit root analysis. 1999:1q-2010:4q 
variable PP test (lags:4, no trend) KPSS test (lags:4, no trend) 
∆ Euribor3m  -3.087 ** 0.057 
∆ empl -4.251 *** 0.443 
∆ real gdp -3.061 *** 0.296 
∆ loans -2.923 * 0.386 
* significant at 1 per cent level, ** significant at 5 per cent level, *** significant at 1 per cent level. ∆ 
= quarterly percentage change. 
 
Using these data, I estimated two equations. The first equation is the following one: 
 
∆rgdp = c + β1*∆loans(-1) + β2*∆Euribor3m(-2) + β3*∆empl(-1) + β4*∆rgdp(-1) 
 
where ∆rgdp is the quarter over quarter real GDP growth rate, c is a constant, ∆loans is the quarter 
over quarter percentage change of loans to non financial firms and households, ∆Euribor3m is the 
quarter over quarter percentage change of the 3 months Euribor rate, ∆empl is the quarter over quarter 
percentage change of the total employees in Italy. There is a lagged dependent variable too. All the 
regressors are lagged. Loans and employees are one-period lagged while the Euribor rate is two 
periods lagged. This difference is linked to the slowness of the effects of the monetary policy. The 
                                                 
5
 As regards data on loans, I employed data published by the Central Banks of Italy instead of the data by ECB because 
the first series covers a more extended sample.  
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series of the loans has been corrected, using data form the Central Bank of Italy, in order to eliminate 
the statistical break of June 2010. The results of this regression are shown in table 3.  
This equation is useful in order to find a long period linkage between loans and growth. There is a 
statistically significant linkage between loans and real GDP. The coefficients on Euribor rate and 
lagged dependent variable are also significant. The coefficient on Euribor rate has the expected sign. 
β3 is not statistically significant. This means that from 1999 to the end of 2010 an increase in loans 
contributed to boost the economic growth.  
 
Table 3: OLS estimation 
Dependent variable: real GDP quarter over quarter percentage change; Sample:1999:1-2010:4, 
robust standard errors 
variable coefficient t statistic p-value 
c -0,0075 -2,7301 0,00921*** 
∆ loans (-1) 0,3709 3,1823 0,00275*** 
∆ Euribor3m (-2) -0,0246 -3,4990 0,00112*** 
∆ empl(-1) 0,2908 1,1839 0,24310 
∆ real gdp(-1) 0,5277 2,9759 0,00483*** 
Adj R
2
: 0.542 D.W.: 2.24 F test: 6.62 ***  
* significant at 1 per cent level, ** significant at 5 per cent level, *** significant at 1 per cent level. ∆ 
= quarterly percentage change.. 
 
In order to test the recoveryless credit growth hypothesis, I decided to add an interaction dummy 
variable to observe the magnitude of this linkage in a more limited period. So, the second step is 
designed to find an econometric pillar to the idea depicted in the previous paragraph. 
To this aim, I estimated a second equation with the same structure of the previous one, but with one 
more regressor. 
 
∆rgdp = c + β1*∆loans(-1) + β2*∆Euribor3m(-2) + β3*∆empl(-1) + β4*(dummy*∆loans(-1)) + 
β5*∆rgdp(-1) 
 
The meaning of the symbols is the same of the previous regression but I added an interaction variable, 
dummy*∆loans. The dummy is equal to 1 from the first quarter 2007 onward and equal to 0 
otherwise. I decided to set the dummy in this way because I suppose that the crisis modified the 
linkage between loans and economic growth in Italy. The results of this second regression are shown 
in table 4. 
The coefficient on the dummy is statistically significant and it has the expected sign. The interaction 
between dummy*∆loans and ∆loans shows that during the last period of the sample, from the first 
quarter 2007 to the end of 2010, the linkage between loans and real GDP has been lower than during 
the previous quarters. This result supports the finding of the previous section: the role of the credit in 
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stimulating the economic growth has changed during the crisis. This linkage has been weak and the 
consequence is a milder positive relationship between credit and economic growth. 
 
Table 4: OLS estimation  
Dependent variable: real GDP quarter over quarter percentage change; Sample:1999:1-2010:4, 
robust standard error 
variable coefficient t statistic P-value 
c -0,0074 -2,5404 0,01496** 
∆ loans (-1) 0,4169 3,0335 0,00418*** 
∆ Euribor3m (-2) -0,0230 -3,4371 0,00136*** 
∆ empl(-1) 0,2712 1,0884 0,28278 
dummy*∆loans(-1) -0,1623 -2,6845 0,01043** 
∆ real gdp(-1) 0,4706 2,6309 0,01194** 
Adj R
2
: 0.568 D.W.: 2.21 F test: 7.01***  
* significant at 1 per cent level, ** significant at 5 per cent level, *** significant at 1 per cent level. ∆ 
= quarterly percentage change. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper I studied the relationship between credit and economic growth in Italy from 1999 to 
2010. The results have highlighted a specific situation in Italy. The credit condition has been positive 
during the recession and even during the very light recovery. For this reason the Italian case seems to 
be in contrast with the finding by Rajan and Zingales (1998). They stated the importance of the 
financial sector in supporting the economic growth. Notwithstanding Italy had a well developed 
financial sector, a banking sector that did not suffer huge problems during the crisis and a flow of 
loans that has been vigorous during the last years, the economic growth has been very light after the 
recession. Moreover, this result is not in line with the study by Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005) too. 
In this work, studying the 1991 recession in the US, they found that high credit contraction is a key 
feature of the cyclical downturn. Even this feature is absent in the Italian case. Finally, a study by 
Bernanke and Lown (1991), about the same 1991 crisis in the US, underlined that a linkage between 
credit crunch and economic crisis exists but they also said that demand factors can explain a big 
portion of the lending slowdown. In Italy even this linkage seemed to be absent during the months of 
the crisis. In fact, Italy experienced a very deep recession and a slow economic recovery during the 
sample I examined, while loans continue to grow with a good pace. So, even the demand factors 
cannot explain this situation. 
This is a real new puzzle that economists should investigate. This has led me to mint the expression 
recoveryless credit growth in order to describe the economic scenario that Italy went through from 
2007 to 2010. A period in which a robust increase in loans has been accompanied by a slack or absent 
economic growth. 
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